

PAST FUTURE AND PRESENT PAST: TEMPORAL DEIXIS IN GREEK ARCHAIC LYRIC*

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Why, I wonder
my song-to-be that I wish to use
my song-to-be that I wish to put together
I wonder why it will not come to me?
At Sioraq it was, at a fishing hole in the ice,
a little trout I could feel on the line
and then it was gone,
I stood jigging
but why is that so difficult, I wonder?
Nestlik Eskimo song: Rasmussen 1931.517–18

Ordinary, face-to-face conversation works on the assumption that any uttered sentence has as its deictic center (*origo*) the person who utters it and as its spatio-temporal reference the moment and place of the utterance

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itself.¹ Even in non-literary discourse, however, things may not be so simple, and circumstances may allow for complex situations.²

Archaic Greek lyric is different from most modern lyric poetry in that it is more strongly related to an actual performance context. Its communication process, however, also differs from ordinary conversation. It originates with a composer of text and score, who usually creates a work meant to be performed at a different place and at a different moment. It is possible for the composer not to take part in (or even be present at) the performance of the text. This is, by any standard, a case of mediated communication. What sense might the use of deictic terms have in such a discourse?

Underlying much recent research on choral lyric has been the assumption that the deictic system should be interpreted as basically performance oriented.³ It is my intention to argue that the relation between the deictic reference system and the performance can be considerably more complex. Deixis in such texts may involve not only their (envisaged) performance situation but also the (representation of their) composition circumstances, and may even shift from one reference system to the other.

A preliminary qualification is probably needed. As with every literary communication, we must always bear in mind that part of the deictic setting may be fictional. There is no point in denying this possibility for archaic lyric, and quite a few texts may be invoked in support of this interpretation.⁴ Any deictic reference system in a text composed to be

1 Cf. the English translation of Bühler 1982 [1934].10; Lyons 1977.2.578–79, 637–38; Levinson 1983.63–64; Green 1992.124.

2 Cf. Green 1992.121: “If deixis operates in a different way in lyric poetry from the way it does in non-literary discourse, it does so in degree, not in kind”; 134: “We need to remember two fundamental points: language seems to be designed primarily for face-to-face interaction . . . ; and it is a capability of humans that they can mobilise discourse beyond this canonical situation and operate language free of contextual boundaries.”

3 On deixis in “choral” lyric, cf. Danielewicz 1990, whose thesis is that choral poets had “to visualise the performance and adapt all the deictic references to its context” (9). The position of Mullen 1982.27 (quoted by Danielewicz 1990.16 n. 25) is more nuanced. A complete identification of the textual deictic reference system (above all, for first-person deixis) with the performance level has been advocated (to quote only the most recent contributions) by Burnett 1998.493–94, Pavese 1997.29–49, Stehle 1997.15–17 and passim (with some allowed exceptions), Lefkowitz 1991 passim and 1995. For a fuller discussion of this and other related problems, cf. D'Alessio (forthcoming).

4 A very selective list of the contributions to the problem includes Rösler 1980, 1983, 1985, 1990; Parker 1981.161; Bowie 1986.16–18; Latacz 1985; Fantuzzi 1993.942–46; Bonanno 1995. Their positions cannot be discussed in detail here; a good treatment of some aspects of the problem is Albert 1988.27–54.

performed at a different moment (and, possibly, place) is, strictly speaking, to be defined as fictional.⁵ Nevertheless, one should distinguish between two fundamental types of fictionality: a kind of *necessary* fictionality (implied by the fact that we are dealing with a *text* composed beforehand and not with a piece of ordinary conversation) and the capacity to evoke a fictional setting with no obvious link to either the composition or the performance context. These two types, of course, may well be seen as different in degree rather than in kind.⁶ I assume that, as a rule, archaic Greek texts staging or evoking their performance context are not to be seen as fictional in this second, stronger sense, but as referring to an actual performance setting through the unavoidably fictional medium of poetic words.

Ancient Greek lyric was orally performed on more or less formal occasions. In some less formal situations, poems may well have been improvised on the spot. It can be argued that a few of these—particularly sympotic poems—may have somehow left traces in the later written tradition. In most cases, however, the orally performed texts were composed beforehand, and the structure of temporal deixis has to deal with at least two temporal levels: the time when the text was composed (Coding Time) and the time when the text was meant to be performed (Receiving Time).⁷

The usual situation in many poems is that the text is designed to work as if it were part of a canonical enunciation situation (face-to-face), with an unmarked deictic center, where CT coincides with RT (“deictic simultaneity”).⁸ This happens in virtually all the texts usually classed as

5 See, as an example, the analysis of deixis in ghost-writers’ speeches by Spitta 1991.225–59.

6 For the difference, cf. Albert 1988.52–53. Anacreon 356ab *PMG*, discussed by Albert 1988.31–33 and 51–53, falls in between (though closer to the first case). For useful observations on the difference between “fiction” and “performative re-enacting,” cf. Nagy 1994–95, particularly 20–21.

7 Cf., e.g., Levinson 1983.62, 73–79 (with previous bibliography), who defines Coding Time as the “time at which an utterance was spoken (or a written message inscribed).” For Green 1992.126–27, “coding time is the time at which the utterance is ‘transmitted’; content time is the time (or times) to which the utterance refers; and receiving time is the time when the utterance is received by the addressee or decoder.” Others, e.g., Gouvard 1998.105–16, focus specifically on the time of enunciation (“le moment où un énoncé quelconque connaît une actualisation, par un locuteur donné, dans un lieu donné,” 110). This may cause some difficulty when describing texts composed beforehand but designed for an oral performance. I would prefer to talk more broadly of time of composition and to designate this as Coding Time.

8 Cf. Lyons 1977.2.685.

monodic lyric, which were meant to be performed in contexts closer to spontaneous face-to-face communication (the symposium, in the first place), and where a higher degree of immediacy was expected (their first performance was usually by the composer herself or himself). The same situation is also found in many “choral” poems.⁹

On the other hand, in some cases of “choral” lyric—on occasions when the text was performed in a more formal context (arguably by a chorus) and the communication situation was farther from spontaneous conversation—the use of temporal deixis causes interpretative problems. How are we meant to interpret the use of the future, for example, in passages such as Alcman frag. 3.7–9 *PMGF*?

ὔπνον ἄ]πὸ γλεφάρων σκεδ[α]σεῖ γλυκύν
]ς δέ μ' ἄγει πεδ' ἄγῶν' ἵμεν
 ἄχι τά]χιστα κόμ[αν ξ]ανθὰν τινάξω.

[The song (?)] *will scatter* sweet [sleep] from (my?) eyelids
 and [. . . ?] leads me to go toward the gathering place
 [where soon] *I shall shake* my blonde hair.

Here a female speaker uses the future tense to describe what seems to be her actual performance of a dance (and even an event preceding it?). And how should we understand a sequence such as that of Pindar *Olympian* 10.78–79 and 84–85,

καί νυν ἐπωνυμίαν χάριν
 νίκας ἀγερώχου κελαδησόμεθα βροντάν . . . Διός . . .
 χλιδῶσα δὲ μολπὰ πρὸς κάλαμον

9 I use the label “choral” to describe those poems usually thought to have been performed by a singing chorus (including the victory odes), though the actual mode of performance cannot always be reconstructed from the texts themselves. I am not here addressing the issue of their actual performances, and my argument does not depend on this assumption. It emerges, however, from this research that poems belonging to this group may show features (such as deictic reference to Coding Time) absent or, at the very least, inconspicuous, in “monodic” poems.

There are, both in “choral” and “monodic” lyric, a few cases (most frequently in Alcaeus) where the text has precise chronological indications of its setting, anchoring it to a particular moment of performance. Such indicators are not fully listed here, and are of no great relevance to our issue, as they represent the default identification of temporal reference and performance context.

ἀντιᾶξει μελέων,
τὰ παρ' εὐκλείῃ Δίρκῃ χρόνῳ μὲν φάνεν,

Now, too, . . . *we shall sing*, in the namesake honour of proud victory, the thunder of Zeus . . . and to the pipe *shall answer* the luxuriant performance of songs which, at last, have appeared by famous Dirce.

where the future refers to the performance of the ode itself (which is, by now, already more than eighty lines long and is going to be over in less than twenty)?

In the main section of this paper, I shall argue that in Pindar's odes, as in other choral poetry, the identification of any temporal reference with the performance is only one of the possibilities. Frequently the temporal *origo* is set *before* the moment of the performance. This feature is to be explained as an effect of the separation between the time of composition (Coding Time) and the time of performance (Receiving Time). As I shall try to show, this is by no means a Pindaric, or even a Greek, idiosyncrasy, but it is also widely attested in songs from different cultural contexts. It is, indeed, a "natural" possibility available to any discourse which takes place in the context of a mediated communication.¹⁰ On the other hand, even cases where the deictic reference system is designed to coincide with the envisaged performance situation, the interaction between the time of ritual performance and the time of myth may produce other interesting effects. In the final section of my paper, I shall examine a few such cases.

In this paper, I am dealing not with the interpretation of verbal tenses but with time deixis—two issues that are connected, but are by no means identical. Thus I am not attempting to offer a new "law" for interpreting Pindar's "futures"; rather, in the course of the study and from the perspective of deictic reference, I hope to illuminate many problems traditionally connected with this issue.

10 Bonifazi 2000.75 treats the deictic situation of the Pindaric passages referring to performance as one of deictic simultaneity. As I shall try to argue here, in many cases, the texts do not work on this presupposition.

PAST FUTURE, BEFORE PERFORMANCE: ENCOMIASTIC AND PERFORMATIVE FUTURES

Any discussion of the use of futures in Pindar and other lyric authors is bound to start from Bundy's influential definition of the "encomiastic future." Bundy's aim was to show that Pindaric futures referring to the act of praising "never point beyond the ode itself." He focused on a class of futures whose "promise," in his opinion, "is often fulfilled by the mere pronunciation of the word," and which "refer without exception to the present."¹¹ He did not offer any linguistic explanation as to the functioning of such futures, apart from stating that they are "conventional."

It is apparently following in his track that, a few years later, W. J. Slater offered a much more detailed explanation of the feature. This, however, was based, at least in part, on premises rather different from those of Bundy. Slater argued that: "Pindar formulates his song by convention roughly for a time, when his chorus is arriving at the place where they are to sing, but at a moment before the song is to be sung."¹² His brilliant paper was a significant contribution to the issue; some important qualifications are, however, needed.

Slater was not dealing only with Pindar's stylistic device of projecting the performance into the future, he was trying to offer a general explanation of Pindar's use of first-person futures, building upon Bundy's interpretation of these futures as "conventional" and "encomiastic." He noted how linguists such as Wackernagel and Löfstedt drew attention to Pindar's "inclination to use the future tense for verbs expressing a will that is present now, but aims at a future action."¹³ According to Slater, however,

11 Cf. Bundy 1986 [1962].21–22. Bundy's primary notion, that Pindaric futures do not have to point beyond the text of the ode itself, was challenged by Carey 1981.178, Pelliccia 1995.317–34, and Pfeijffer 1999a.

12 Slater 1969b.88; this position is shared by Danielewicz 1990.15, even though it is incompatible, strictly speaking, with "the central position of the perspective of performance" he accepts in his paper.

13 Wackernagel 1920.59–61 (quotation from 61: "Neigung, das Futurum zu setzen bei Verben, die eine jetzt vorhandene, aber auf zukünftiges Tun abzielende Willensrichtung ausdrücken") deals specifically with the use of optative and future *with verbs denoting the concept of will*, and explains this phenomenon as a transfer to such verbs of the mood or tense one would normally use to express desire or intention without a verb of will. Löfstedt 1933.125–29 also deals only with this kind of verb, with some more examples, and takes into consideration two possibilities: Wackernagel's (a "psychological explanation") and an alternative "logical explanation" (as, e.g., in Kühner and Gerth 1898.1.172–73: "ich werde

these scholars “regarded this as a purely grammatical phenomenon, and did not note that the Pindaric use is practically limited to statements of the type ‘I shall sing, glorify, testify, etc.’ It was E. Bundy who first drew attention to the conventional nature of these futures and so ended years of misunderstanding.”

Now, it is debatable whether Bundy’s explanation of the phenomenon was really anything other than “purely grammatical.” He may have stressed the rhetorical function of such a practice, but he did, in fact, explain the future at the end of *Isthmian* 4, for example, *not* (as Slater’s claim implies) as a statement from a point of view anterior to the performance, but as a *self-fulfilling statement*, which is something quite different.¹⁴ It is not surprising, therefore, that later scholars may have added to the confusion by tracing back to Bundy *both* “a future tense used in the ode of the poet’s intention when composing it”¹⁵ and the so-called “performative future” (a future used for “self-fulfilling utterances”).¹⁶

Slater based his notion of a future based on a pre-performance reference time on an idea well attested in previous scholarship. He cited as a precedent the explanation given by Schadewaldt of a much debated imperative (*Olympian* 6.92: εἶπον). A similar interpretation of a few Pindaric futures, however, was already implied, as early as 1879, in a remark by Fennell, and was then formulated on a more general level by Drachmann in 1893 and followed by others.¹⁷ In his attempt to reconcile such intuitions

von jetzt an nur geneigt sein”). He finds the first one more persuasive in the case of Pind. *Ol.* 7.20; cf. Pelliccia 1995.326 n. 90.

14 Bundy 1986 [1962].21: “Thus κομᾶξομαι in the last line of *I.* 4 does not promise a second ode in praise of the victor and his trainer, but informs the audience of the importance of the trainer’s role in securing the current victory: ‘In praising him I would add the name of Orseas.’”

15 Willcock 1995.2, who calls it an “encomiastic future.”

16 An antecedent for the label “performative futures” is Slater 1977.204 n. 63 (“the future of performance utterance”). On “performative futures,” see Cole 1992.23 (who keeps the Pindaric futures he refers to distinct from those projecting the performance into the future); Hummel 1993.231, 234; Calame 1994–95.144–45 and 152 n. 25; Henrichs 1994–95.80 (and 104 n. 97), 87; Faraone 1995. Aloni 1995.401 and Stehle 1997.89 extend the label to cases of third-person futures (cf. below p. 277 and n. 34, p. 292 and n. 90). For recent, and, in my opinion, justified criticism of this notion, cf. below n. 33.

17 Cf. Fennell 1879 ad *Pyth.* 9.89 (followed by others) and Drachmann 1892–93.163–68 (the most detailed treatment of the problem before Slater). Drachmann was followed by Schroeder 1922 ad *Pyth.* 9.73 (“das Futurum . . . vom Standpunkt des meditierenden Dichters; aber auch Pindar vermag sich, ganz wie unsere Festredner, schon zu Hause in Ort und Stunde des Vortrags zu versetzen: σάμερον μὲν χρῆ P. IV 1; so denn auch mit τάνδε πόλιν [91] nach Kyrene”), ad *Pyth.* 9.89 (where, however, the passages quoted, apart from

with Bundy's definition, however, Slater applied it to cases which belong to different categories and require different explanations. Some of his futures express the speaker's willingness to do what he or she actually goes on to do immediately thereafter. These futures (e.g., "I shall sing about X," "I shall not mention Y," "I shall stop now") do not pose any problem of incompatibility between their temporal reference point and that of the performance.¹⁸ Their reference is text-internal ("intra-carminial" in Pelliccia's terms, to be discussed presently), and they belong to a class found in most kinds of speeches and texts. They are not specifically encomiastic, nor Pindaric, nor more conventional than many other features of ordinary language. Slater does not clearly distinguish between these instances and those future references which can be explained only by assuming a point of view anterior to the performance.

It is particularly to the "intra-carminial" futures that H. Pelliccia has devoted a recent contribution, challenging the validity of the notion of "performative futures" (developed on the basis of Bundy's "encomiastic" or "self-fulfilling" futures) and effectively showing that such futures do have a *prospective* force. Futures of a performative verb refer to an action that begins with the statement and continues into the future: they cannot simply be assimilated to forms of the present.¹⁹ Pelliccia proposes a division into: 1) intra-carminial programmatic futures;²⁰ 2) future performative utterances such as ἐγγυάσομαι;²¹ and 3) extra-carminial (encomiastic) rhetorical futures such as "Somebody will testify," or "His fame shall never die."

Ol. 10.79, 84, do not belong, in my opinion, in the same category), and 10.55. Slater 1969b.87 n. 5 referred to Schadevaldt 1928.38 (296) n. 1 (and to Wilamowitz 1922.402 n. 2): Schadevaldt treated not only imperatives (as Slater implies) but also many of the passages listed in my survey (including some futures) as seen from the point of view of the composition. Cf., more recently, Burton 1962.53–54 and, along the same line, Mullen 1982.27–31.

18 This criticism is already implied in Fogelmark 1972.93–104, though he does not mention the cases where the performance time is indeed projected into the future.

19 Neither the problem raised by the prospective force of the futures (even in a "modal" interpretation), nor the one linked to the projection of the performance into the future comes out clearly enough in Hummel 1993.228–36.

20 Pelliccia 1995.324–25: whether they are proper futures or short vowel subjunctives "is irrelevant; both types can be used prospectively . . . and in such prospective use are properly said to possess future time-reference."

21 Pelliccia 1995.326: "Its effect derives from its prospective reference; however minimal, the temporality is real, in the basic sense that the rhetorical effect of the utterance depends, parasitically or otherwise, upon some sort of sense that the assertion refers to or is guaranteed in the future."

Under his last rubric, Pelliccia explains “the common use of imperatives, vows, and prayers at the end of odes” as a way to “create the impression that the celebration and praise will continue (ideally forever).”²² I find unconvincing his explanation of all these instances as a promise of future diffusion of the song and of the patron’s renown. While in passages like those adduced by Pelliccia (Ibycus S 151.48–49 *PMGF* and Bacchylides 13.228–31),²³ the poets refer to different and *new* occasions, the Pindaric cases under examination do not allow a distinction, implicit or explicit, between the original performance and a future and different one.²⁴ Furthermore, Pelliccia’s classification does not cover such cases as Alcman’s *Astymeloisa Partheneion* (above p. 270, Pindar *Olympian* 10.84 (ἀντιόξει, above, p. 270–71), the projection of the performance into the future at the end of *Isthmian* 2, and many others that are catalogued in my survey below. In fact, although Pelliccia quotes Slater’s remarks on the anteriority of the point of view in relation to the performance moment,²⁵ he discusses no cases belonging to this category, which corresponds to none of his three classes.

The problem of a temporal *origo* situated before the performance situation is also largely ignored in the recent analysis by Pfeijffer.²⁶ He locates most of the examples which imply projection of the performance or composition into the future under his category IB: “‘Fictional’ futures announcing the ode as a whole.”²⁷ In these passages, according to Pfeijffer, “the poet dramatises his own role, staging himself as composing his odes on the very spot.” Other futures “with a text internal reference” form his group IA: “futures referring to a later moment in the ode.”

Pfeijffer’s IB group, however, includes examples that can not all be explained in the same way. One should avoid confusion between futures that announce *the rest of the ode* at its beginning (as does the future ἀείσομαι in the *Homeric Hymns*) and those cases where the deictic reference is not

22 Pelliccia 1995.332. He quotes a precedent for his interpretation in Fogelmark 1972.96 and 101.

23 Cf also Bacchyl. 3.96–98: Maehler 1982.2.62 suggests that this refers to both the original performance and to future ones, but the unqualified τις, together with the future (as opposed to, e.g., an imperative), is too vague to suggest a *specific* performance. Theogn. 20–22 and 237–52 belong to the same category.

24 See below, survey, group 2.

25 Pelliccia 1995.321–22 n. 80.

26 Pfeijffer 1999a.

27 Pfeijffer 1999a.33–43.

compatible with a moment during the performance. The former group includes such passages as Pindar *Pae.* 2.1–4, Alcman frags. 28 and 29 *PMGF* (and the Beatles' *incipit*: "Lend me your ears and I'll sing you a song / And I'll try not to sing out of key") that should really have been included in Pfeijffer's IA group.²⁸ Distinct from these are cases such as the *Olympian* 10 passage discussed above, *Isthmian* 6.73, the proems of *Nemean* 3 and *Isthmian* 1, and δέξεται in *Pythian* 9.73 (all of which Pfeijffer includes in the same group), and the end of *Isthmian* 2.²⁹ Pfeijffer seems aware of the problem implied by the blurred distinction between his groups IA, where the future announces a particular theme, and IB, where the future more generically announces the song.³⁰ Such a distinction is artificial and obscures the much more relevant difference between those cases where the future announcement is compatible with a reference-point *during the performance* and those in which, with the *performance as a whole* set in the future, the temporal zero-point is incompatible with any moment during the performance.³¹ In these cases, the future cannot be taken as an announcement of something to come in the text, since it occurs at the very end of the ode.

BETWEEN COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE

Many recent critics, as we have seen, have furthered Bundy's interpretation of the "encomiastic future" as a self-fulfilling performative

28 Pfeijffer 1999a.40–41, and 33, for the Beatles example.

29 He does not discuss the end of *Isthmian* 2, as it has no first-person future, but it belongs in the same category as it has a future reference.

30 Pfeiffer 1999a.42–43.

31 Pfeijffer's definition, in 1999a.41–42, is convoluted and partly self-contradictory. It is, therefore, necessary to quote it in full (*italics mine*): "There seems to be no objection against rescuing the 'encomiastic' future as a stylistic device fictionally projecting praise into the future, as long as it is realised that, in its typical form, this type of future (i) occurs *exclusively* under well-defined conditions, viz. in the opening lines of the poem; (ii) has a well-defined function, viz. fictionally projecting the beginning of the song into the future; (iii) is by no means an exclusively Pindaric idiosyncrasy. Whereas the usage of the 'fictional future,' *announcing the ode as a whole*, is a typically *proemial* device, it appears that the fictional projection of the performance into the future *may extend well into the ode* in the case of *P.* 9.73 and of *I.* 6.74, the two final Pindaric examples discussed (the concluding prayer of *N.* 9 . . . and the imperatives in *N.* 2.25 may be compared). It is for these two cases that the description of the future in terms of an exclusively Pindaric stylistic phenomenon holds true, for the scope of the futural fiction is unparalleled and indeed remarkable."

sentence, introducing the label “performative future.”³² This notion has come under effective attack by both Pelliccia and Pfeijffer.³³ A fresh look at the well-known passage from the beginning of Alcman’s *Astymeloisa Partheneion* (not quoted by Slater, Pelliccia, or Pfeijffer) can demonstrate its inadequacy. Here the speaker seems to use the future tense to describe a moment *preceding* the performance, and one cannot, obviously, talk of a “performative future”³⁴ as the term in this case should refer to actions that have *already* taken place. Only two possibilities are open: either the performance starts before the chorus arrives at the ἄγών (a rather unlikely solution),³⁵ or the temporal zero-point of these utterances does not coincide with, but in fact precedes, the time of performance. It coincides, in fact, with the moment of the production of the song, fictionally represented as proceeding from the Muses to the choir³⁶ immediately before the performance. We find the same situation in some of Pindar’s odes, such as *Olympian* 10 and *Nemean* 3, with the important difference that, in Pindar, the gap between the production, in which the figure of the poet/author is involved, and the performance of the ode is wider and is skilfully exploited.

In Alcman’s ode, the temporal reference shifts in the course of the song, judging from the fragmentary lines 64–70 that describe some stages of

32 Cf. above, n. 16.

33 Cf., for more details, Pfeijffer 1999a.15, 69–75.

34 Cf., e.g., Stehle 1997.89 n. 61, quoting Calame 1983.400 ad loc. and *PMGF* ad loc. (with further bibliography). These authorities, however, do not support such an interpretation. Treu 1965.445–46 (from a 1961 lecture, not influenced by Bundy’s “encomiastic future”) stresses the *mimetic* stance of lyric proems in many cultures. His parallels (which include German medieval lyrics) are not all of the same kind: most of them may refer also to events taking place *during* the performance. His conclusion is correct: “Vergangenes wird in die Zukunft projiziert oder in die Gegenwart: es erscheint als frohe Erwartung.” This has nothing to do with “performative” futures. For Calame 1977.2.110–11 n. 124, “l’alternance du futur et du présent n’est pas significative d’une différence chronologique dans les actes décrits . . . cf. δραμῆται (v. 59, futur) et μάχονται (v. 63, présent),” (he refers to Garzya 1963.34 n. 56). The two cases are different: δραμῆται implies the opinion that, in a competition, the “second one” will run as a Colaxaios horse; μάχονται describes an actual state of competition (so, in fact, also Garzya 1963.34 n. 56). Parker 1981.161 follows Treu 1965.444–46.

35 This scenario seems to have been taken into consideration by Albert 1988.41, who does not accept Treu’s “mimetic” explanation of vv. 61–85, but mentions the possibility that there may have been “eine Szenerieveränderung” between the beginning of the ode and this section.

36 The figure of the poet seems to have played no role in these verses, though it is impossible to be certain due to the fragmentary nature of the remains.

the performance as past or as going on at the present. In Pindar's odes, too, there are similar shifts: e.g., the performed song, invoked at the beginning of *Nemean* 3, is described in lines 65–66 as having at last started (ἔβαλεν),³⁷ and *Olympian* 10.94 depicts the action of lyre and aulos as present (ἀναπάσσει), while ἀντιόξει in line 84 anticipates song, dance, and music in the future. The temporal *origo* shifts from before the ode's composition to the performance moment. Slater's collocation of the temporal *origo* to a moment immediately preceding the performance, however, does not adequately describe the situation we find in some other Pindaric odes, which present even the moment of the communication of the song to the singers and their arrival at the patron's venue as future events.³⁸ This is clearly the case for *Isthmian* 2, where ὅταν . . . ἔλθῃς (47–48) implies that the chorus (or, at any rate, Nicasippus with Pindar's song) has not yet arrived at the home of the speaker's guest-friend.

A FICTIONAL PROCESS?

C. Carey described Pindar as successfully concealing the “trying business” of “the creation of an epinician” under an appearance of naïveté, through a sort of “oral subterfuge” whereby the poet lends an informal and spontaneous look to his words. In Carey's words, Pindar “creates and sustains the impression of extempore composition.”³⁹ This may work for

37 On the interpretation of this passage, cf., most recently, Carey 1989.556 and Ferrari 1990.18.

38 Slater's choice was a reaction to Schadewaldt 1928.38 (296) n. 1 (“von dem Augenblick erfaßt und gestaltet in dem er dichtet”) on the grounds that this is in contradiction with the use of the aorist describing the arrival of the first person to the venue of the celebration. Cole 1992.24 offers a more elaborate account of Slater's solution: “the song was imagined as continuously repeated, or rehearsed and revised, during the procession of the κῶμος, only receiving a final performance—for the benefit of those who had not had the opportunity to hear it en route—just before or just after the act of reception.” This does not seem to work in many cases (as in *Isth.* 2, where it is Nicasippus, not the speaker, who is going to meet the patron), and it is difficult to envisage for complex odes like *Nem.* 3 and *Ol.* 10. There is, however, no reason to suppose that Pindar would have consistently used the same reference point in all his odes: cf. Schroeder 1922 ad *Pyth.* 9.73, Pelliccia 1995.321–22 n. 80, Schmid 1998.179 (quoting *Nem.* 3.1–12, 9.1–12, *Ol.* 10.1–12, *Isth.* 1.1–10, 2.47–48, and 5.62–63). The reference point can also shift within a single ode: cf. survey, group 4. The circumstances of the performance (presence or absence of the poet, temporal distance from the event celebrated, performance in the victor's homeland or elsewhere) may have dictated different solutions at different times.

39 Carey 1981.5.

some odes, but it does not cover the more complex situation of poems where the very gap between composition and performance is dramatized—a practice incompatible with the notion that the text represents itself as either an impromptu composition or impromptu performance. For such cases, Carey’s later formulation is more appropriate: Pindar “speaks as though he were meditating on the contents or shape of his song prior to or during composition, whereas of course the ode is complete by time of performance.”⁴⁰ Pindar does *not* pretend in these cases to stage his songs as impromptu performances; instead he dramatizes the process of their creation—their history *before* the performance—even creating in some cases a *gap* between text and performance. The expected text is replaced by another one, a mimesis of the process of its own production. The poet exploits the separation between text and performance while apparently effacing it.

Are we entitled to call this process fictional? Perhaps we are, if we look at it from the point of view of the *performed* text.⁴¹ I think we are not, when we realize that the temporal deictic system in such a communication process may naturally also include the Coding Time. From this point of view, we should, paradoxically, be more entitled to call fictional a text where the poet has made the performers utter statements strictly centered around the performance deictic system (as he or she often does). It is in such cases, I believe, that we may rightly speak of “staging.”

Perhaps it is not totally appropriate to call this process, with Carey, an “oral subterfuge.” Certainly an oral dimension arises from the impression of informality which the text can convey. Nevertheless, the result, in my opinion, is to stress the *distance* implied in a complex communication process. This may happen in mediated communication. Whether or not oral transmission is preponderant (as it certainly was for Greek archaic lyric) in this process, seems to me largely immaterial. Once a text comes into being as part of a mediated communication process, it may easily embed in itself meta-textual descriptive elements: it may enclose information about its own

40 Cf. Carey 1989.552. It must be added that the point of view may change within the same song. Cf. also the distinction between “extempore *speech*” and “extempore *composition*” in Miller 1993.21 n. 1 and Scodel 1996.

41 See, e.g., Pfeijffer 1999a.66: “Such a presentation is fictional; it creates the illusion that the ode has not started yet.” I cannot see what the point of such an illusion (i.e., pretending that the *performed* ode has not yet started) may have been in a *performance* strategy. The notion of fictionality inherent in the definition of “oral subterfuge” is criticized from a different point of view by Bonifazi 2000.

(real or, more frequently, represented) “history.” This leads to a potential discrepancy in the internal use of deictic elements, a discrepancy which may well also take place in written communication.⁴²

SOME COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE

The device of dramatizing the composition process *in the text* is by no means a peculiarity of Pindar and is not limited to ancient Greek choral lyric. It can be found also in other poems designed for oral performance from other cultural contexts, as, for example, in the Occitanic lyrics of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. A song by William IX, Duke of Aquitaine (Guilhem de Peitieu, early twelfth century) begins with the words: “*Farai un vers, pos mi sonelh, / e-m vauc e m'estauc al solelh*” (“*I shall do a song, since I am dozing / And riding and staying in the sun*”).⁴³ In his *vers de dreit nien*, the making of the song is set in the future at the beginning of the poem and described as completed at the end: cf. verses 1–6: “*Farai un vers de dreit nien: / non er de mi ni d'autra gen, / non er d'amor ni de joven, / ni de ren au, / qu'enans fo trobatz en durmen / sus un chivau,*” and 43–48: “*Fait ai lo vers, no sai de cui; / et trametrai lo a celui / que lo-m trametra per autrui / enves Anjau, / que-m tramezes del sieu estui / la contraclui*” (“*I'll do a song about nothing at all; / It won't be about me nor about others, / It won't be about love nor about happiness / Nor about nothing else, / For it was composed earlier while (I was) sleeping / On a horse*”; “*I've done the song, about whom I don't know; / And I'll send it over*

42 For a “written” example, cf., e.g., the beginning of P. Claudel’s prose poem *La pluie* (discussed in Gouvard 1998.106–13): “Par les deux fenêtres qui sont en face de moi, les deux fenêtres qui sont à ma gauche, et les deux fenêtres qui sont à ma droite, je vois, j’entends d’une oreille et de l’autre tomber immensément la pluie. Je pense qu’il est un quart d’heure après midi: autour de moi, tout est lumière et eau. *Je porte ma plume à l’encrier*, et jouissant de la sécurité de mon emprisonnement, intérieur, aquatique, tel qu’un insecte dans le milieu d’une bulle d’air, *j’écris ce poème*” (“Through the two windows in front of me, the two windows that are on my left, the two windows that are on my right, I see, I perceive, with one ear and with the other, the rain that immensely falls. I think it is a quarter after noon: around me everything is light and water. *I bring my pen to the inkpot*, and, rejoicing at the safety of my imprisonment, internal, aquatic, as an insect in the middle of an air bubble, *I write this poem*.” This case is comparable to instances like Pindar *Ol.* 1.17–19 and others (survey, group 1), where the performance is described as starting *after* the actual beginning of the *text*.

43 PC 183.12 (5 Pasero), verses 1–2. Translation from Bond 1982.19.

to the one / Who will send it for me through another / Toward Anjou, / So that (she) might send me a copy of the key / To her coffer").⁴⁴

The future tense at a song's start announces the poem as a whole and has the function of presenting it as a work in progress.⁴⁵ It may be accompanied by a final past tense referring to the completion of the song.⁴⁶ One possible effect of this device is a fictional coincidence of production and performance, presenting the song as an impromptu composition.⁴⁷ As happens in the Greek texts, the situation may also be more complex, and the "impromptu" fictional effect, while certainly operative, cannot account for all the implications. In the first of the Occitanic songs quoted above, the verb refers to the pretended moment of its composition, which can hardly coincide with the (pretended or real) moment of its transmission or performance. This may be true also for the second song, where the process of composition is described in the same sentence as future (*farai*) and as past (*fo trobatz*), the latter implying the point of view of the completed poem.⁴⁸

The same alternation between past and future is exploited in another *incipit* dramatizing the process of composition: "Ben vueill que sapchon

44 PC 183.7 (4 Pasero). Translation from Bond 1982.15 and 17.

45 This kind of *incipit*, with *farai* and the like, is very common in other songs of this author (1, 4, 8, and 11 Pasero) and in later Occitanic poetry: cf., e.g., the "metapoetical" passages by Raimbaut d'Aurenga quoted by Di Girolamo 1989.130–31. Gruber 1985.40–41 remarks how "zu der inszenierten Fiktion gehört es beispielweise, dass ein Trobadadorlied als opus *in fieri* dargeboten wird (*Farai un vers . . .*), das in Wahrheit das Ergebnis einer schwierigen und langwierigen Komposition ist," and, 41 n. 6 adds that 10 per cent of all the exordial *coblas* show incipitary formulas of this kind.

46 Cf., e.g., Raimbaut d'Aurenga (PC 389.28, a development on the same theme as Guilhem's PC 183.7), with the *incipit* "Escotatz . . . mas no say que s'es / senhor, so que vuehl comensar" ("Listen . . . but I don't know, sir, what I want to begin"), whose last *cobla* begins: "Er fenisc mo no-say-que-s'es, / c'aisi l'ay volgut batejar" ("Now I end my I-don't-know-what, as I have thus decided to christen it"). In this case (as in others), the poem is indeed presented as being composed *during* the performance. On the final formula of Guilhem's song, cf. Pasero 1973.110. The song ends with an *envoi* envisaging a performance context where the "speaker" is not present (Pasero 1973.111–12; cf. also 7.44ff.); more on this problem in D'Alessio (forthcoming).

47 Cf. Rieger 1990, in particular 428–29.

48 There may also be a distinction between the composition of the poem (*faire*) and its ideation (*trobar*). A different explanation is theoretically possible (though less persuasive, in my opinion), since the verb *faire* may refer to the performance of the already composed song rather than to its composition (cf. Bond 1982.5). It must be noted, however, that the same situation for which the future of *faire* is used in the first song (i.e., dozing, while riding), is described with the past of *trobar* in the second one: it seems unlikely that one should refer to performance and the other to composition.

li pluzor / d'un vers, si es de bona color / qu'ieu *ai trat* de mon obrador; /
 qu'ieu port d'aicel mester la flor, / et es vertatz, / e puecs ne trair lo vers
 auctor, / *quant er lasatz*" ("I want everyone to know / That a song is of good
 quality [literally: of a song, whether / that it is of good color] / Which *I have*
brought forth from my workshop, / For I take the prize in that profession— /
 And that's the truth!— / And I can produce the song itself as witness of that /
When it's laced up").⁴⁹

In this last case, the future does not indicate something which is going to take place later on in the text. The verb refers not to the poem reaching its end, progressing toward its conclusion, but to the poem being completed with all its formal features: linguistic, metrical, and musical. It can be explained only from a point of view anterior to the existence of the poem in its present form.⁵⁰ In other cases, above all in the *tornadas*, the performance of the texts is projected in the future.⁵¹

All these features are not to be explained as rhetorical devices suggesting a fictional identification of production and performance, though

49 Translation from Bond 1982.25: the verb corresponding to "it's laced up" is a future.

50 The projection of the completion of the present song into the future (whether its refinement or the composition of its score) is a not uncommon feature in Occitanic songs: cf., e.g., Giraut de Bornelh, PC 242.51 (37 Sharman), 54ff.: "Per qu'ieu pren vassalatge / d'aitan, si m'o aconseyllatz, / que-l vers, *pueys er ben asonatz*, / trametrai el viatge, / si trob qui lai lo-m port viatz, / ab que-s s deport e-s don solatz" ("And so, if you advise me to, I will summon up enough courage to send my song on its way, *furnished with a fine tune* [literally, 'when it is furnished with a fine tune,' translating a temporal clause where the verb is a past future], if I can find someone to bear it swiftly to her, someone who likes to be joyful and amused" (trans. Sharman). Sharman 1989.221 comments: "Giraut has composed the words, now all he needs is the melody." Note, in particular, Arnaut Daniel PC 29.10 (10 Toja), 1–7: "Ab guai so cuindet e leri / fas motz e capus e doli, / *que seran verai e sert* / *quan n'aurai passat la lima*, / qu'Amor marves plan'e daura / mon chantar que de lieis muez / cui Pretz manten e governa" ("To a gay, gracious, and happy tune, / I compose and plane and smoothe words / which *will be* true and precise / *once I have filed them* [translating an original past future], / as Love is eager to polish and to gild / my song, which is inspired by her / whom Value sustains and governs"). Another case where the poem is presented as a work in progress, but not in a *linear* sense, may be found in the final *cobla* of Cercamon's PC 112.1c: "Plas es lo vers, vauc l'afinan / Ses mot vila, fals, apostitz, / Et es totz enaissi noiritz / C'ap motz politz lo vau uzan: / E tot ades va-s meilluran / S'es qi be-l chant ni be-l desplaï" ("The song is plain, and I am refining it / without any trivial, false, or faked word, / and has been nurtured in such a way / that I use it with polished words: / and it is going to become soon better / if there is somebody who sings it well, and explains it well").

51 Cf. *trametrai* in Guilhem 5.43, in Giraut de Bornelh 37.57 (cf. n. 50, above), and, e.g., Bernart de Ventadorn 4.61–62: "Ma chanson apren a dire, / Alegret."

this may be, in some cases, one of the effects achieved. They are better seen, I believe, as a result of the difference in temporal reference implied in their composition and transmission processes.

In other cultural contexts, too, it is quite usual for the spatio-temporal zero-point implied in the texts to refer to the composition level rather than to the performance occasion. An instructive case is provided by the Gilbertese love song described by Ruth Finnegan in her fundamental work, *Oral Poetry*:⁵² “How deep are my thoughts as I sit on the point of land / thinking of her tonight.” Gilbertese oral poetry is, in fact, the fruit of a process of composition several days long, involving both the poet’s solitary meditation and the intervention of experts from the community. After many long rehearsals, a group of singers and dancers “as much as two hundred strong” would have performed the final product (Finnegan 1977.156). It is very unlikely that the temporal and spatial setting of these lines corresponded to their performance context. Notwithstanding the importance of the performance occasion, the tenses used in the text, along with the temporal and local indicators, seem clearly to refer to its notional composition.

A particularly complex example is provided by the Nestlik Eskimo song quoted at the beginning of this article,⁵³ where the difficulty of song-making is compared with that of fishing. The resulting text, very much as in Pindar, dramatizes its own production, and this dramatization takes the place of the expected finished product.⁵⁴

The use of tenses and temporal indicators referring to the composition moment, rather than to the performance, is a common feature in orally performed (and even in orally composed) poetry from the most varied cultural contexts. It is explained by the fact that orally performed texts may have been composed beforehand, and their focus may be directed at either the composition or the performance level, depending upon the occasion or communication strategies chosen by the composers.⁵⁵ It is often not possible to pinpoint a single temporal level accounting for all the variations between the beginning of the composition process and the end of the performance.

52 Finnegan 1977.82–83, after Grimble 1957.202, 206.

53 Discussed by Finnegan 1977.80, after Rasmussen 1931.517–18.

54 For the usual distinction between composition and performance contexts in Eskimo poetry, cf. Finnegan 1977.81–82.

55 There is no reason to assume that it is only in texts belonging to a context of written communication that the moment of composition (CT), as distinct from the moment of performance (RT), comes to the foreground (as is most recently maintained by Bonifazi 2000.84).

In some of Pindar's songs, as I hope to demonstrate in my survey of relevant passages, the interplay between the two possible extremes is exploited in a more refined and self-conscious way than is usual in other comparable cases.

TIME DEIXIS IN PINDAR: A SURVEY OF THE RELEVANT PASSAGES

The following survey takes into account deictic elements such as temporal deictic pronouns and adverbs, verbal tenses, moods, and equivalent periphrastic expressions,⁵⁶ as well as temporal deictic references implied in some elements of spatial deixis (see group 4 below).

Three possible collocations of the deictic temporal *origo* (= 0) in relation to the Coding Time (CT) and the Receiving Time (RT) are useful in describing the texts surveyed. I do not mean, however, to provide an exhaustive and strict classification. In my account, CT is not the *actual* CT during which the text was composed, but its *representation* in the text itself, and RT does not necessarily refer to an *actual* communication situation, but to the communication situation *as envisaged in the text itself*.

A: 0 = RT. The difference between CT and RT tends to be effaced ("deictic simultaneity").

B: 0 = CT. RT is projected into the future, and CT is often presented as immediately preceding RT.

C: 0 = a moment immediately preceding the CT.

The temporal *origo* may shift throughout the text (cf., above all, group 4 below). Cases belonging exclusively to A are not listed here. Of the cases discussed below, the ones in group 1 either belong to B or move from B to A. The cases where C may be relevant are *Nemean* 9 (group 2), *Isthmian* 1 and *Olympian* 6 (group 3), *Nemean* 3 and *Olympian* 10 (group 4).

56 For the distinction between deictic terms and deictic elements, cf., e.g., Green 1992.122–23. For the relation between tense and time, cf. Lyons 1977.2.677–90, 809–23; on the future, cf., in particular, Fleischman 1982.7–31.

1) A song is described as starting *after* its actual performance has started (B, or $B \rightarrow A$).

At *Olympian* 1.17–19, the speaker⁵⁷ exhorts himself to take up the lyre and sing of Hieron's victory. This projects the very *start* of the performance of *Olympian* 1 into the future.⁵⁸ The preceding lines describe the victory at Olympia as the source of inspiration for those who have gathered at Hieron's symposium to sing Zeus (8–11). Thus the text, as part of a *mediated* communication context, embeds information on its own (represented) genesis.⁵⁹ A similar case, but at the very beginning of the ode, is found in Bacchyl. frags. 20B.1–5 and 20C.1–7. Likewise, in *Nemean* 10.21–22, a self-exhortation to raise the sound of the lyre follows a longer (and broken-off) catalogue of Argive glories and introduces the praise of the victor: once again, *in the performance*, the sound of the lyre has, in fact, already started once the ode begins. For *Nemean* 9.8–10, which contains a self-exhortation to start the performance, cf. below, group 2.

2) A song *ends* with the announcement of its own performance (B).⁶⁰

At the end of *Isthmian* 6.74–75, the speaker says that he will give sacred water from Dirce to Lampon and his family. $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\omega$ is to be interpreted as a future referring to the communication of the song to the patrons.⁶¹ The time when the song is communicated to the audience is projected into the future.

The same applies to *Isthmian* 4.72–72b, where $\kappa\omicron\mu\acute{\alpha}\xi\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ is to be taken as a future referring to the performance as a whole.⁶² Pfeijffer's interpretation of this verb as referring to a revel starting *after* the performance of

57 With the term "speaker" (as with *persona loquens*), I mean the textual entity which functions as the subject of a first-person sentence in a given text, where it works as a part of a literary construction, product of a precise communication strategy: cf., in general, D'Alessio 1994, and, in particular, against any approach which aims at *identifying* the speaker, 121; Felson 1999.9–11. Schmid 1998.151 finds such use of the term equivocal. Terminology apart, however, his position comes very close to, if it is not identical with, mine (cf. his warning against the "continuous misinterpretation of the speaker as a person instead of a rhetorical construct").

58 Explanations involving ad hoc hypotheses on the intervention of the lyre only at v. 17 are mentioned, and criticized, in Gerber 1982.42–43.

59 Cf. above n. 42, for a parallel also from written texts.

60 Perhaps B and C, in the case of *Nem.* 9?

61 Cf. Privitera 1982.214–15, for the links with the sympotic imagery of the poem.

62 So, rightly, among others, Schadewaldt 1928.38 (= 296) n. 1, Thummer 1968–69.2.80, Privitera 1982.186, and Willcock 1995.87.

the ode⁶³ fails to explain the words *τερπνὸν ἐπιστάζων χάριν*, which imply that the *κῶμος* involves the “poetic” participation of the speaker, with words and music.

At *Isthmian* 2.47–48,⁶⁴ too, the moment of the song’s performance is set in the future. It does not make sense to speak of this passage as announcing a *second* performance.⁶⁵ The speaker exhorts Nicasippus to tell the patron, Thrasybulus, not to hush “these hymns” (τούσδ’ ὕμνους)—that is to perform them—ὅταν ξεῖνον ἐμὸν ἡθαῖον ἔλθῃς (“when you [Nicasippus] go to my trusty guest-friend”). This clearly implies that Thrasybulus, addressed throughout the rest of the ode, cannot have perceived its content before the moment described in verses 47–48: without the patron’s presence, a previous performance may have signified only a rehearsal.⁶⁶

At *Isthmian* 5.21–22, the speaker has come to Aegina (ἔμολον). In 62–63, he addresses someone (the chorus, the speaker himself?), and exhorts the addressee to bring a crown, a diadem and, at the same time, to send along (σύμπεμψον) a new hymn to Pytheas, the victor’s elder brother, whose achievements are also praised in the song. This may theoretically be taken as an exhortation to perform the ode once again for Pytheas. It is, however, far more likely that both brothers were present at the same performance and that the imperative refers to that same celebration, which, in this case, would be, once again, projected into the future.⁶⁷

The case of *Nemean* 2.23–25 should probably be interpreted in the same way,⁶⁸ though the explicit reference to the *beginning* of a performance at the *end* of this short poem is more puzzling (κωμάξατε . . . ἐξάρχετε). Other possibilities are that the song was meant to be repeated several times (*da capo*)⁶⁹ or (far less likely, in my opinion) that it served as a prelude for a further vocal celebration.⁷⁰

63 Pfeijffer 1999a.58–60: he finds it “odd that this expression of the poet’s intention occurs in the *final* (italics mine) verse of the ode.”

64 Cf. also above, 278, for the context.

65 So Pavese 1997.39.

66 Other implications of this passage for first-person pronominal deixis are discussed in D’Alessio (forthcoming).

67 I think that οἱ in line 62 is more easily understood as referring to Pytheas. If, however, with most critics, we refer οἱ to the victor Phylakidas (cf., e.g., Privitera 1982.202), the theoretical problem discussed above becomes irrelevant, and the imperative σύμπεμψον ὕμνον *must* refer to a projection into the future of the communication of the ode on the occasion of its performance before the victor.

68 Cf., e.g., Slater 1969b.90, Carey 1989.551 n. 14.

69 Cf. Fränkel 1951.488 n. 6.

70 So, e.g., Wilamowitz 1922.158, Schadewalt 1928.38 (= 296) n. 1.

In *Olympian* 11.16–19, immediately before the end of the ode, the Muses are invited to join in a κῶμος at Locri Epizephyrri, the victor's hometown (for the motif, cf. *Nemean* 9.1–4, quoted below). Earlier interpreters took this (together with the future κελαδήσω at line 14 and other passages in the ode) as an announcement of *Olympian* 10, a longer ode for the same victor. *Olympian* 11 would then be a song meant for performance at Olympia, but embedding the promise of a further ode, to be performed at Locri. Bundy, quite correctly, argued that there is no need to look for anything outside *Olympian* 11 itself. His explanation of the future reference, however, is not entirely satisfactory: the Muses' arrival at Locri is, indeed, seen as a future event (ἐγγράσομαι . . . ἀφίξεσθαι), and this implies that the poetic performance at Locri is projected into the future.⁷¹ According to Pfeijffer, "the victor's praise is seen in the form of a promise to praise him," a promise the poet "is not going to fulfill . . . within the compass of his ode."⁷² F. Ferrari, comparing the beginnings of *Pythian* 4 and *Nemean* 3 (I would add *Nemean* 9), takes the address to the Muses as referring to the performance of *Olympian* 11 itself: in his opinion, however, its position at the end of the ode suggests that the poem was first performed at Olympia and that verses 16–19 announce its future performance at Locri.⁷³ This is a possible but not necessary scenario. Announcing the performance of the ode at its very end seems to have been a typical Pindaric device and does not always imply multiple performances at different venues (cf. *Isthmian* 4, 5, and 6, and *Nemean* 2, above). In this short poem, the device makes up a substantial portion of the text.

Nemean 9 presents a complex situation. Verses 1–4 are an exhortation to the Muses, and to the speaker himself, to join in an imaginary revel (κωμάσομεν) from Sicyon (the place of victory) to Aetna (the victor's hometown) and to produce a hymn (ῥυμνον πράσσετε), presented as their impromptu composition. The theme is taken up again, after a parenthesis, at 8–10, with a self-exhortation (belonging to group 1, above) to start the performance with lyre and aulos. At 54–55, the speaker vows to Zeus to sing ταύταν ἀρετάν ("this success") and honour victory with words, shooting close to the Muses' mark. This seems to imply a moment prior to the actual

71 Cf. Bundy 1986 [1962].1.20–24, 27–28. As for verses 16–19, he argues that, though "the arrival motive . . . points formally to the future," it must anyway refer to the present ode, as it always does when it recurs in other odes (where, however, either the past or the present tense usually occur).

72 Pfeijffer 1999a.64–65.

73 Ferrari 1998.182–83.

song, and, strictly speaking, even to the moment described in the opening lines: the final sentence would, therefore, project the *composition* of the ode, not its performance, into the future (as in C, above).⁷⁴

Nemean 5.50–54 probably does not belong here. At the end of the ode, the speaker addresses himself: “If you have come to sing Themistius [the athlete’s grandfather], do not shrink: give forth your voice, raise your sails . . . : sing that he has won twice . . . at Epidauros, and bring,⁷⁵ together with the fair-haired Graces, leafy crowns of flowers to Aeacus’s πρόθυρα.” This may refer to the present celebration, which is, however, not necessarily projected into the future, as the imperatives may be self-fulfilling.

3) Other cases of composition and/or performance projected into the future.

In *Partheneion* 2.6–16, the situation may be very similar to the one in Alcman’s Astymeloisa *Partheneion*, with the chorus projecting into the future the *preparation* of the actual performance.⁷⁶ This is likely but not completely certain, as the future may theoretically refer only to the main verbs (the speaker announces what and how she is going to sing), while the aorist participle ζωσαμένα may refer to a past action. Therefore, the whole sentence does not necessarily have to be taken as projecting into the future something which took place *before* the performance rather than *during* it. Anyway, in this case, too, the accompaniment of the *auliskoi* must be imagined as having started already at the beginning of the ode (cf. above, group 1). Verses 38–41: the speaker has come to the chorus as a witness to the patrons (between B and A).

In *Pythian* 10.55–59, the speaker hopes that when the men of Ephyra will pour out *his* sweet voice by the Peneius (55–56: Ἐφουραίων ὄπ’

74 For a discussion of a far less plausible alternative explanation (not “I pray that I may . . .,” but “I avow that I have . . .”), cf. Pelliccia 1995.341 n. 118, Farnell 1932.315. If ταύταν ἀρετάν is taken to refer not to “this success” but, more generally, to the victor’s valour (cf. Bury 1890.183–84), the sentence might be compared to the wishes at the end of *Ol.* 1 and *Pyth.* 2. In this case, however, a temporal qualification (“always” or “again”) would be needed to make the reference unambiguous after ταύταν.

75 With Wilamowitz’s φέρε in place of the transmitted φέρειν, defended by Pfeijffer 1999b.190. With the transmitted text, the speaker is urged to say that Themistius has won a double victory at Epidauros and that he carries or (has carried) crowns of flowers in Aeacus’s πρόθυρα. I assume that σὺν ξανθαῖς Χάρισσιν implies that the action of carrying the crowns temporally coincides with the singing of a song: cf. *Ol.* 7.93, *Nem.* 4.7, 9.54, 10.38, *Isth.* 5.21, *Pae.* 5.6 (my new text, in Rutherford 2001.293) 6.3–4, 7.10, the *prosodion* fr. 52m.7, Bacchyl. 5.9, and *PMG* 871.3.

76 Cf., e.g., Treu 1965.445–46 and Carey 1989.552 n. 15.

ἀμφὶ Πηνειὸν γλυκεῖαν προχέοντων ἐμάν), he will increase, with his songs, the victor's attractiveness (ἔλπομαι . . . τὸν Ἴπποκλέαν ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον σὺν αἰοδαῖς ἕκατι στεφάνων θαητόν . . . θησέμεν). It has been debated whether this refers to the first performance of the ode or to a second one.⁷⁷ The first solution is, in my opinion, correct. However, even if we accept the second performance hypothesis, the text would include a sentence where the time of a performance, foreseen as real, is presented as different from the reference time of the text itself. From the point of view of *that* performance, a discrepancy in the time-reference system is unavoidable (B).

Isthmian 1.6: ζεύξω presents the production of both the present ode and a paean for the Ceians as *in fieri*⁷⁸ (C or, possibly, between C and B).

In *Isthmian* 8.1–8, the speaker exhorts someone (τις, 1) to go to the victor's home and start a κῶμος in his honour (ἀνεγειρέτω κῶμον, 3–4). The speaker, too, has been requested, in spite of his grief, to invoke the Muse, and he is going to share his sweet product with the audience. If the κῶμος referred to is the one at which the song is being performed (a point which has been a topic of much debate),⁷⁹ this would be another case of a temporal *origo* anterior to the beginning of the performance (B).

In *Olympian* 6.22–28, the speaker addresses Phintis (the victor's charioteer according to the scholia), asking him to prepare a mule-chariot for him; σάμερον (“today”) he must go to Pitana (a metaphorical journey to the starting place for the myth). At 86, the speaker shall drink water from Thebes (or, less likely, from Arcadian Metopa), while weaving a song for the patrons; in 87–92, the speaker addresses an Aeneas: he should *now* exhort the comrades to sing of Hera, to see whether the speaker has avoided the insult “Boeotian sow,” and to tell them to remember Syracuse. The use of πίομαι in 86 (“I shall drink”) has provoked much discussion. It should be clear that it cannot be interpreted as a present.⁸⁰ Its deictic relevance varies, depending on the interpretation of its subject. If the subject represents the

77 For the idea that the text refers to a foreseen second performance, cf. Pavese 1975.242 and Gentili in Gentili, Bernardini, Cingano, Giannini 1995.xxix. Contra, e.g., Bernardini, *ibid.*, 642 and Carey 1989.548 (who refers not to Pavese but to a similar opinion independently expressed by Lefkowitz 1988.5 and Heath 1988.187 n. 18).

78 Pfeijffer 1999a.40 sees in this a case of the future announcing the ode as a whole; he fails to see that the composition of another ode is also involved. The sense of the future here is better captured by Mullen 1982.235 n. 46. Cf. also Pelliccia 1995.329 n. 96.

79 A summary of the debate is in Carey 1989.549–51.

80 Goldhill 1991.160–61 and Stehle 1997.164–65 are the only recent critics, to my knowledge, who translate it as a present, without discussing the form.

narrative function of the author, and if the verb suggests a metaphor for poetic inspiration, we have here a case of production projected into the future, comparable to other passages discussed above (*Nemean* 9, *Isthmian* 1) and below (*Nemean* 3 and *Olympian* 10). If, however, it refers to the performers, the verb may indicate their receiving the water of poetry from Pindar and their performing his song.⁸¹ In both cases, either composition or performance are projected into the future (C or B).

4) Finally, some cases of shifting temporal reference.

In *Pythian* 2.3–4, the speaker is coming from Thebes to Syracuse bringing the song (τόδε . . . φέρων μέλος ἔρχομαι); in 67–68, the song is being sent (πέμπεται) over the grey sea as Phoenician merchandise. The use of the present here is relevant to our discussion. Even if we argue, as I think we should, that πέμπω does not necessarily always imply a physical separation between sender and receiver,⁸² the use of the present implies that the temporal zero-point cannot be the RT of the performance (or immediately before it), as it was in verses 3–4. The same situation (but without any apparent shift in time-reference) is found in *Bacchyl.* 5.9–16, with πέμπει in lines 11–12 (the poet sends the song from Ceos to Syracuse) implying a temporal level anterior to that of the performance. The temporal deixis in these texts is comparable to those epistolary communications where the present is used to indicate the act of sending the message, referring, thereby, not to RT, but to CT.⁸³ In *Pythian* 2, there is also a shift from RT to CT.

Pythian 9.73–75: Cyrene will welcome the victor back from Delphi. If we assume that the ode was performed in Cyrene (cf. 91: πόλιν τάνδ[ε]),⁸⁴ the future must refer to a point of view anterior to the foreseen performance⁸⁵ (and to the victor's homecoming). With this interpretation, the temporal

81 For this second solution, cf. Vendruscolo 1994. I believe that the former solution is preferable, and shall deal with this controversial passage in more detail elsewhere.

82 More on this problem in D'Alessio (forthcoming).

83 Both alternatives are available in different contexts: Latin epistolary communication is usually centered on RT rather than on CT; Greek letters are generally more CT oriented. For cases of the co-presence of CT and RT in the same sentence, cf., e.g., Cic. *Att.* 1.4.3: "in Formiano sunt (sc. signa) quo ego *nunc* proficisci *cogitabam*" (I owe this quotation to A. Garcea). For the general problem, cf. Levinson 1983.73–74, with bibliography, and Gouvard 1998.112–16.

84 For the arguments against identifying 91: πόλιν τάνδ(ε) with either Delphi or Thebes, cf. D'Alessio 1994.131–32 n. 47.

85 This may be reflected also in the future κομάσομαι at v. 89: the arguments of Carey 1981.93 seem more persuasive than the explanation of Pfeijffer 1999a.48 (who sees this

deictic reference implied in the local deictic⁸⁶ τάνδ(ε) = Cyrene is different from the one implied in the use of δέξεται, with Cyrene as a subject, in line 73: there is a shift from CT to RT.⁸⁷

Two odes by Pindar that skilfully exploit the possibilities offered by such shifts are *Nemean* 3 and *Olympian* 10.

In *Nemean* 3, the whole ode is built upon a remarkable progression:⁸⁸ the time-reference shifts from the moment of production—seen as coincident with the transmission of the song by the Muse through the poet to the singers—to the moment of performance. The present tense in verse 4 (μένοντ[αι]), and the imperatives in verses 3, 9, and 10 (ἴκεο, ὄπαζε, ἄρχε) presuppose a time-reference immediately anterior to the performance (ἐν ἱερομηνίᾳ Νεμεάδι, 2), as do the futures in verse 12 (κοινάσομαι, ἔξει). On the other hand, at 65–66, the aorist ἔβαλεν presupposes a stage when the performance has started. For the tense of verse 77, πέμπω, cf. *Pythian* 2.67–68 and Bacchyl. 5.12 (above p. 290). This ode also shares the delay motif (80: ὁπέ περ) with *Olympian* 10. The time reference shifts: C → B → A (and, perhaps, back to B again).

In *Olympian* 10.1–12, the speaker urges an undesignated plural addressee⁸⁹ to read aloud Archestratus's son, who is inscribed in the speaker's mind; the future has arrived, putting the speaker to shame: he had forgotten his debt of a song to the victor, but he will pay it back with interest with the help of the Muse and Alatheia. At 78–85, the speaker declares he will sing

passage as a “generic” statement), if one accepts that the victor has indeed won also at the Iolaeia (an issue that depends on the controversial interpretation of *viv* at v. 80). Cf. also *Isth.* 4.72a–72b, discussed above in group 2.

86 “Place deixis always incorporates a covert time deixis element, while the converse is not true,” cf. Levinson 1983.85; see also Lyons 1977.2.684–85.

87 For a further discussion of this passage, cf. Felson, in this volume. This case will be dealt with in more detail in D'Alessio (forthcoming) together with other cases of possible time and space shifts (as *Ol.* 8 and *Pae.* 6).

88 Cf. Slater 1969b.87–88, Carey 1989.551–56, Ferrari 1990.

89 The identity of the addressee is *prima facie* unclear. I cannot understand how it could be “used ‘absolutely’”: Verdenius 1988.55 (after Viljoen 1955.32, *quod non vidi*), comparing *Pyth.* 6.1, 11.38, *Isth.* 3.15 and 4.35, where the addressees seem to be the audience. This was the opinion of some critics concerning our passage, too, but it would make little sense here. The plural addressees may theoretically be the chorus, and the reference would be to performance rather than to composition: cf. Nagy 1990b.171–72. What the addressees should read aloud, however, is not the song but the patron's name (so, rightly, e.g., Verdenius): this is still too vague to refer to an already existing song. The identity of addressees is made clear in the next sentence: they are the Muse and Alatheia, and the poet asks for their collaboration in the production of the song.

following the ways the first Olympian games were celebrated: to the sound of the aulos the performance of the songs will respond, songs which, at last, have appeared in Thebes (cf. above p. 270–71 for the text). The production of this poem, an event described in the future at the beginning of the ode, is now seen as accomplished, even if late (χρόνῳ μὲν φάνεν, 85); the time of *performance* is now set in the future (ἀντιάξει, 84).⁹⁰ Shifting time is skilfully exploited as a thematic device throughout the whole ode, one of Pindar's most brilliant. The performance is then described as actual and present at verses 93–94 (ἀναπάσσει), while, at 98, an aorist (ἀμφέπεσον) refers to the act of composing⁹¹ (C → B → A).

TIME PRESENT AND TIME PAST: MYTH AND RITE

The projection of the performance—and even of the existence of the song itself—into the future, as explored above, is not the only possibility available to the poet. Most odes have a more straightforward identification (or quasi-identification) of textual time with performance time: the text is the basis for the staged performance very much as in the case of a dramatic performance.

Performance within a ritual context, in its turn, may interact with yet another temporal level, the time of myth. One of the most remarkable occurrences of temporal deixis in archaic lyric is represented by Pindar's so-called **Pae.* 15 (which was probably, in fact, a *Prosodion*).⁹²

Τῶδ' ἐν ἄματι τερπνῶ
ἵπποι μὲν ἀθάνονται

90 Pfeijffer 1999a.30 explains κελαδησόμεθα in 79 as a text-internal announcement, i.e., as referring to something to be dealt with subsequently in the ode. This is unconvincing: the use of ἀντιάξει in the next sentence clearly implies that the future refers to the performance of this ode *as a whole*. Aloni 1995.400–01 interprets the two verbs as performative futures (against the use of such label, cf. above, 276–78).

Stinton 1985.416–17 had rejected Elmsley's conjecture ἀνολολύζεται for Soph. *Tr.* 205 on the grounds that it "is possible only if the future refers to the present occasion, as first-person futures sometimes do in Pindar; in the third person this usage is doubtful." Other cases of third-person future are Pind. *Pyth.* 9.73 (cf. above, p. 290–91) and Alcman frag. 3.7 *PMGF* (discussed above, p. 277–78).

91 There is little likelihood that this verb may refer to performance rather than to composition. The following αἶνησα (100) may also be taken to have a present value, though, in this context, a proper aorist is perhaps more probable.

92 Cf. Rutherford 1992, D'Alessio 1997.34–35.

Ποσειδᾶνος ἄγοντ' Αἰακ[,
 Νηρεὺς δ' ὁ γέρων ἔπετα[ι
 πατήρ δὲ Κρονίων μολ[
 πρὸς ὄμμα βαλὼν χερὶ [
 τράπεζαν θεῶν ἐπ' ἀμβ[ρο
 ἵνα οἱ κέχυται πιεῖν νε[κταρ
 ἔρχεται δ' ἐνιαυτῷ.

On this pleasant day, Poseidon's immortal mares bring . . .
 Aeacus . . . and Nereus, the Old Man, follows . . . and
 father Cronion, turning his eye [upon those who ?] ap-
 proach, [with his] hand . . . to the gods' imm[ortal] table
 . . . where ne[ctar] has been poured for him to drink. And,
 at the completion of the year, there comes . . .

In this case, the temporal reference, implied in the deictic adjective τῷδε and in the use of the present tense, refers to a mythical event, the wedding of Aeacus (?) with a goddess. Mythical time is merged with the time of the performance, and the myth is re-enacted in a rite, accompanied by the processional song. This was certainly not a Pindaric innovation: the overlap had its roots in cultic practice.⁹³ Sappho frag. 140 V preserves two lines of a dialogue between some maidens and Aphrodite concerning the death of Adonis:

κατθνάσκει, Κυθήρη', ἄβρος Ἀδωνις· τί κε θεῖμεν;
 καττύπτεσθε, κόραι, καὶ κατερείκεσθε χίτωνας.

"Delicate Adonis is dying, Cytherea; what can we do?"
 "Beat your breasts, girls, and rend your tunics."

The two verses, quoted by Hephaestion, most probably come from the beginning of the song. There was apparently no narrative frame: it was the ritual situation itself that gave the clue for understanding the temporal reference.⁹⁴ Close both to Sappho's text and to the situation in Pindar is the

93 Cf. Sinos 1993.83–86, with bibliography. A possibly similar case in *Pythian* 5.85–86 is discussed by Krummen 1990.120–24 and compared to ours by Rutherford 2001.412–13.

94 Cf. Reiner 1938.107–08, who quotes Plut. *Alc.* 18.5: Ἀδωνίων . . . εἰς τὰς ἡμέρας ἐκείνας καθηκόντων εἴδωλά τε πολλαχοῦ νεκροῖς ἐκκομιζομένοις ὅμοια προὔκειτο ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ ταφὰς ἐμμοῦντο κοπτόμεναι καὶ θρήνους ᾄδον.

Hellenistic hexameter poem by Bion on the *Death of Adonis*. In this poem, an anonymous speaker mourns the dead hero and describes the events following his death as present. The use of deictic elements in the last two lines is particularly interesting (97–98):

λῆγε γόων, Κυθήρεια, τὸ σήμερον, ἴσχεο κομμῶν·
δεῖ σε πάλιν κλαῦσαι, πάλιν εἰς ἕτος ἄλλο δακρῦσαι.

“Stop your wailing, Cythera, for today; cease from breast-beatings. You must cry again, weep again another year.”
(translation from Reed 1997.131)

This implies a transfer to the ritual present, which, on the one hand, re-enacts the mythical event, but, on the other, will cyclically return. The same feature is present at the beginning of the second strophe in Pindar’s *Prosodion*, v. 9: ἔρχεται δ’ ἐνιαυτῷ, where the word ἐνιαυτός is used in the sense of “anniversary.”⁹⁵ Both poems are formulated in such a way that they can conveniently be used at every return of the ritual event.

This correspondence has some bearing on the issue of the “invention” of mimetic poetry in the Hellenistic age. Bion’s poem is normally considered a case of a later Hellenistic poet further elaborating the Callimachean invention of mimetic poetry.⁹⁶ I have no intention of denying that Bion’s poem, both in its formal and structural features, bears every mark of the Alexandrian age, or that its debt to Callimachus is profound. Nor would I suggest that his poem must have necessarily accompanied an actual rite, as the songs of Pindar and Sappho presumably did. The metre, the mixture of mimesis and diegesis, the speaker’s participation in the pathos, and the difficulty of adapting the time of narration to the time of the rite may all be considered typical Hellenistic features.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, its mimetic construction, re-enacting a mythical event which merges into the ritual occasion, cannot be considered a Hellenistic invention: it was already familiar to archaic poets like Pindar and Sappho.

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95 Cf. D’Alessio 1997.35.

96 Cf., e.g., the discussion in Albert 1988.92 and n. 263, where he concludes: “auch in der sonstigen griechischen Literatur wird man Vergleichbares kaum finden”; Fantuzzi 1985.155–56; Reed 1997.16–17.

97 Wilamowitz 1900.9–17 = 1925⁴.299–305, Friedländer 1931.36–37, Reed 1997.17–18.